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Letter to the Editor
To the Editor:
Let me begin by gratefully acknowledging the work
of the Foundation, the Editors, and all contributing par-
ties on this landmark achievement. I am doubly thank-
ful as it appears that the Journal, alongside its offering
of peer-reviewed research and practitioner case re-
ports, intends also to provide a forum for the necessary
theoretical discussions that should inform the work of
any community of researchers.
It is in this latter vein that I wish to respond to Prof.
Moyer’s editorial as printed in the inaugural issue.
I am not at all as sanguine as Prof. Moyer regarding
the rehabilitation of the word “reduction.” Nor do I
share his view that the term “reduction” is in any way
synonymous with the proposed equivalents—viz., “fo-
cus” and “narrowing.” The choice to include the phrase
“when properly understood” itself seems a tacit
acknowledgement of the fact that over the course of
the past century (and not merely “popularly”), the un-
derstanding of the relationship between “the methods
of science” and “reduction” has in fact not moved in
that direction. Rather, the confusion of terms has per-
sisted and has resulted in both being held suspect. Given
the history of the word, I cannot follow him in accept-
ing the term “reduction” as a neutral placeholder for
the set of procedures that “scientists do.”
The methods of science are not—on the whole—
most aptly characterized by the term “reductionism,”
or as being “reductive,” and it seems doubly problem-
atic to suggest so during a discussion of its application
in relation to persons. The “methods of science” are
not a unified body of techniques and approaches, but
rather refer generally to the use of deductive and in-
ductive reasoning applied not only to the results but,
optimally, in the generation of hypothesis, experimen-
tal design, and procedure. Such efforts are not them-
selves “reductionistic” because they cannot be other
than they are and still be “science.” What can be char-
acterized as reductionistic, or “reductionism,” is the
making of the move from the data derived from such
procedures to then saying that nothing more than what
is happening in a given experiment (based on a par-
ticular idealization of a given phenomena) is what is
occurring, or is at bottom the case. In other words, to
be guilty of the charge of being “reductionistic” is to
be ideologically committed to certain metaphysical
presuppositions which in some sense can be said to
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have either an explanatory or ontologic priority over
both the phenomenon under investigation and the em-
pirical data resulting from an experiment carried out
upon a purportedly well-defined problem. It is the meta-
physical claim that phenomena at one “level” can be
completely understood by the explanation of phenom-
ena at a “lower level.”
I want to suggest that there is a substantive differ-
ence between the methodologic necessity to
“operationalize” a problem or definition and “reduc-
tion” itself. Proponents of the philosophic position that
links understanding with reduction in science have, his-
torically, failed to account for the distorting idealiza-
tion that accompanies experimental research into
phenomena. While not an absolute danger (a view that
Prof. Moyer rightly endeavored to counter), it nonethe-
less remains a significant concern.
Prof. Moyer writes, “It is only by reducing the focus
to a specified level that some understanding of the
whole can be approached.” However, this statement
does seem to be begging the question. With reference
to the example of “love in Homo sapiens,” what is the
“specified level” appropriate to gaining an understand-
ing on the level love is sought to be understood? By
this example, we recognize that the central question
before researchers remains: What philosophic and
methodologic position shall be used to “specify” a level
beyond which explanation is reductive or, conversely,
sufficient? How do researchers intend to go about draw-
ing the line between what is and what is not a “signifi-
cant part” of the “whole,” given that, historically, truly
“reductive” practices have made it appear almost as a
species of non-sense to make a case for the types of
understanding relevant to some of our deepest concerns
as therapists and as persons? That things are “to a
greater or lesser extent greater than the sum of [their]
parts” does not help us answer this question: When
does our study cease to be of the thing in question and
become merely some other thing, the findings regard-
ing which we try to interpret with respect to the origi-
nal investigation?
Perhaps I will be seen to have put too fine a point on
matters that were not Prof. Moyer’s main concern.
However, open debate on such questions would have
the advantage of helping to avoid the immanent trag-
edy of hoisting ourselves upon a petard of our own
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that do not respect the complexity of how we practice.
Though we must keep practice with Ockham’s razor, we
must also not be too hasty in limiting what “counts” in
our clinical experience lest a necessary and unique di-
mension of practice be unwittingly thrown out—a dimen-
sion that other health care professions, with varying
degrees of candor, themselves lament having sacrificed.
Such questions will also weigh upon the kind of mo-
tives that we are permitted to sensibly ascribe to oth-
ers; even the DeBakey’s of the world.
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